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Citations for "Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the 'Most Favored Nation' clause"

by Choi, Jay Pil

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  1. Bagwell, Kyle & Bown, Chad P. & Staiger, Robert, 2015. "Is the WTO Passé?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2010. "Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 49-62, September.
  4. Saggi, Kamal, 2009. "The MFN clause, welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 132-143, January.
  5. Missios, Paul & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2006. "The Role of MFN under Asymmetries in Environmental Standards," MPRA Paper 70810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. She, Chih-Min, 2015. "What determines the technology adoption of firms under optimal tax?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 274-289.
  7. Jay Pil Choi & Byung-Cheol Kim, 2008. "Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2390, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Theodore To, 1999. "Dynamics and Discriminatory Import Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1057-1068, August.
  9. Rodney Ludema (Georgetown University) and Anna Maria Mayda (Georgetown University and CEPR), 2005. "Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-13, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 467-485, Autumn.
  11. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C, 2001. "Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favoured Nation Clause," CEPR Discussion Papers 2859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "Weak Versus Strong Net Neutrality," NBER Working Papers 20160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 2000. "GATT-think," Working papers 19, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  14. Hsiu-Li Chen, 2000. "On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas with Endogenous Technology Choice," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 55-67, December.
  15. Saggi, Kamal, 2004. "Tariffs and the most favored nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 341-368, July.
  16. Cebi, Pinar & Ludema, Rodney, 2002. "The Rise and Fall of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause," Working Papers 15853, United States International Trade Commission, Office of Economics.
  17. Saggi, Kamal & Sengul, Faruk & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2007. "Sustaining multilateral cooperation among asymmetric countries: Does MFN help?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 543-562.
  18. Rodney D. Ludema & Taizo Takeno, 2007. "Tariffs and the adoption of clean technology under asymmetric information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1100-1117, November.
  19. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2012. "Free Trade, Time-Consistent Tariff, and Market Size: The Role of GATT/WTO as Commitment Devices," Discussion Paper Series 79, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jan 2012.
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