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Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong & Shue Mei, 2013. "Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 352-368, December.
  2. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2025. "A Strategic Analysis of Narcoterrorism: Counterterrorism, Terrorist Extortion, and Illicit Drug Trafficking," Working Papers 2025-032, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  3. Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2023. "Common myths of terrorism," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 271-301, April.
  4. Kjell Hausken, 2023. "Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(11), pages 1-18, November.
  5. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 30(3), pages 21-46.
  6. Cárceles-Poveda, Eva & Tauman, Yair, 2011. "A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 49-65, January.
  7. J. Atsu Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2012. "The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(2), pages 313-330, April.
  8. Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong & Shue Mei, 2014. "A game-theoretic analysis of information sharing and security investment for complementary firms," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 65(11), pages 1682-1691, November.
  9. Hausken, Kjell, 2025. "A two-period model of counterterrorism with terrorist sponsoring and the role of hatred," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 15(C).
  10. Wang, Bin & Kou, Gang & Xiao, Hui, 2025. "Defending a series signaling system against uncertain attack time with individual protection, false nodes, and overarching protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 264(PA).
  11. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2011. "Preventive strike vs. false targets and protection in defense strategy," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(8), pages 912-924.
  12. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2023. "Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 500-513.
  13. Opher Baron & Oded Berman & Arieh Gavious, 2018. "A Game Between a Terrorist and a Passive Defender," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 27(3), pages 433-457, March.
  14. João Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2021. "The Path of Terror Attacks," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-11, April.
  15. Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang, 2011. "Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T -Period Game," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 46-70, March.
  16. Bertrand Crettez & Naila Hayek, 2014. "Terrorists’ Eradication Versus Perpetual Terror War," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 679-702, February.
  17. Kjell Hausken, 2019. "A Game Theoretic Model of Adversaries and Media Manipulation," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-15, December.
  18. Hausken, Kjell, 2024. "Fifty Years of Operations Research in Defense," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 318(2), pages 355-368.
  19. Wang, Shuliang & Gu, Xifeng & Luan, Shengyang & Zhao, Mingwei, 2021. "Resilience analysis of interdependent critical infrastructure systems considering deep learning and network theory," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 35(C).
  20. Satya P. Das & Sajal Lahiri, 2021. "Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 416-445, December.
  21. Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 33-55.
  22. Simon, Jay & Omar, Ayman, 2020. "Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: Coordination and a strategic attacker," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 161-171.
  23. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 407-425, October.
  24. Hunt, Kyle & Zhuang, Jun, 2024. "A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 401-417.
  25. Liang, Liang & Chen, Jingxian & Siqueira, Kevin, 2020. "Revenge or continued attack and defense in defender–attacker conflicts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(3), pages 1180-1190.
  26. Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong, 2016. "A differential game approach to security investment and information sharing in a competitive environment," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(6), pages 511-526, June.
  27. Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong, 2016. "Economic incentives in security information sharing: the effects of market structures," Information Technology and Management, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 361-377, December.
  28. Satya P. Das & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2014. "Deterrence, Preemption, And Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem Of Terrorism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 219-238, January.
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