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Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ohta, Katsunori & Tamura, Yuji, 2023. "Refugee Resettlement," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1237, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  2. Harstad, Bård, 2023. "Pledge-and-review bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  3. Valentin Goranko, 2022. "Preplay Negotiations with Unconditional Offers of Side Payments in Two-Player Strategic-Form Games: Towards Non-Cooperative Cooperation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(14), pages 1-21, July.
  4. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
  5. Jindani, Sam, 2022. "Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  6. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2016. "Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  7. Zhao, Rui R., 2012. "Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 964-983.
  8. Rampal, Jeevant, 2022. "Limited Foresight Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 166-188.
  9. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  10. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities," Papers 2105.01581, arXiv.org.
  11. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  12. , & , & , & ,, 2014. "Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  13. Ortner, Juan, 2023. "Bargaining with evolving private information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  14. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2013. "A two-sided reputation result with long-run players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 376-392.
  15. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Våge Knutsen, Magnus, 2022. "The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 454-468.
  16. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  17. Jonas Send & Marco Serena, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  18. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
  19. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation," 2009 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  20. repec:pri:metric:wp053_2013_abreu_pearce_implementing-the-nash-program-in-stochastic-games is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Maciejovsky, Boris & Wernerfelt, Birger, 2011. "Costs of implementation: Bargaining costs versus allocative efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 318-325, March.
  22. Zhihong Wang & Lima Zhao & Yuwei Shao & Xiaojuan Wen, 2023. "Reputation compensation for incentive alignment in a supply chain with trade credit under information asymmetry," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 331(1), pages 581-604, December.
  23. David K Levine, 2023. "Efficiently Breaking the Folk Theorem by Reliably Communicating Long Term Commitments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001832, David K. Levine.
  24. Okada, A. & Sabourian, H., 2025. "Collusive Behaviour, Efficiency and Cheap Talk Negotiation in Repeated Games," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2575, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  25. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
  26. Okada, A. & Sabourian, H., 2025. "Collusive Behaviour, Efficiency and Cheap Talk Negotiation in Repeated Games," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2532, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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