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Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2022. "Progressive participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
  2. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "The Uniqueness of Dynamic Groves Mechanisms on Restricted Domains," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 37, pages 263-285.
  3. Rohit Lamba, 2022. "Efficiency with(out) intermediation in repeated bilateral trade," Papers 2202.04201, arXiv.org.
  4. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2018. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers," Papers 1812.02993, arXiv.org.
  5. Wu, Haoyang, 2022. "A type-adjustable mechanism where the designer may obtain more payoffs by optimally controlling distributions of agents' types," MPRA Paper 113150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Bharadwaj Satchidanandan & Munther A. Dahleh, 2022. "Incentive Compatibility in Two-Stage Repeated Stochastic Games," Papers 2203.10206, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  7. Daniel Fershtman & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Matching auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 32-62, March.
  8. Liu, Bin & Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2020. "Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  9. Huiyi Guo & Wei He & Bin Liu, 2022. "Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2209.01453, arXiv.org.
  10. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers," Papers 2105.07649, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
  11. Chifeng Dai, 2022. "Optimal risk sharing with ex post private information: Rules versus discretion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(1), pages 160-184, July.
  12. Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 15969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
  14. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction," Papers 2106.04850, arXiv.org.
  15. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2021. "Analytical Method for Mechanism Design in Partially Observable Markov Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-15, February.
  17. Martino Banchio & Frank Yang, 2021. "Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment," Papers 2102.07742, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
  18. Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George & Psomas, Alexandros & Rubinstein, Aviad, 2022. "On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 399-427.
  19. Krasikov, Ilia & Lamba, Rohit, 2021. "A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  20. Rosella Levaggi & Michele Moretto & Paolo Pertile, 2023. "Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services," Working Papers 2023.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  21. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2019. "Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts," Working Papers 19-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  22. Rey, David & Levin, Michael W. & Dixit, Vinayak V., 2021. "Online incentive-compatible mechanisms for traffic intersection auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 293(1), pages 229-247.
  23. Kimon Drakopoulos & Ali Makhdoumi, 2023. "Providing Data Samples for Free," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3536-3560, June.
  24. Jonathan Libgober & Xiaosheng Mu, 2022. "Coasian Dynamics under Informational Robustness," Papers 2202.04616, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  25. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Withers, John A., 2019. "Dynamic regulation revisited: Signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect," DICE Discussion Papers 318, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  26. Wei Zhang & Long Gao & Mohammad Zolghadr & Dawei Jian & Mohsen ElHafsi, 2023. "Dynamic incentives for sustainable contract farming," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(7), pages 2049-2067, July.
  27. Tangerås, Thomas & Gick, Wolfgang, 2021. "Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses," Working Paper Series 1390, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  28. Chifeng Dai, 2021. "Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 92-125, February.
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