IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v158y2026icp1-34.html

Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Gui, Shan
  • Houser, Daniel

Abstract

We study dynamic mechanism design in non-clairvoyant environments, where sellers cannot forecast future demand and buyers hold private information. Using two laboratory experiments, we evaluate two non-clairvoyant mechanisms: the dynamic maximin-optimal non-clairvoyant mechanism (DM, Mirrokni et al., 2020) and the repeated static optimal mechanism (RS, Myerson, 1981). Experiment 1 compares DM and RS between demand-distribution scenarios and shows that non-clairvoyant mechanisms perform as intended: DM either outperforms or underperforms RS depending on the scenario, consistent with theory. Building on these results, Experiment 2 examines the optimal clairvoyant mechanism (OC) and a different implementation of DM. In surprising contrast to theory, OC using full information performs no better than the non-clairvoyant mechanisms, while DM performs equally well across implementation forms. Our results highlight the practical importance of non-clairvoyant mechanisms as implementable approaches to dynamic auction design in uncertain markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Gui, Shan & Houser, Daniel, 2026. "Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 1-34.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:158:y:2026:i:c:p:1-34
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825626000291
    Download Restriction: Full text may be restricted for ScienceDirect subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
    2. Andrew M. Davis & Elena Katok & Anthony M. Kwasnica, 2014. "Should Sellers Prefer Auctions? A Laboratory Comparison of Auctions and Sequential Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(4), pages 990-1008, April.
    3. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
    4. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    5. Devanur, Nikhil R. & Peres, Yuval & Sivan, Balasubramanian, 2019. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 570-588.
    6. Arthur J.H.C. Schram & Sander Onderstal, 2009. "Bidding To Give: An Experimental Comparison Of Auctions For Charity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 431-457, May.
    7. Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George & Psomas, Alexandros & Rubinstein, Aviad, 2022. "On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 399-427.
    8. Lu, Jingfeng & Zhao, Wenbo, 2026. "Intertemporal bundling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    9. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
    10. Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, January.
    11. Hema Yoganarasimhan & Ebrahim Barzegary & Abhishek Pani, 2023. "Design and Evaluation of Optimal Free Trials," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3220-3240, June.
    12. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    13. Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2014. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 601-653, March.
    14. Noussair, Charles & Silver, Jonathon, 2006. "Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 189-206, April.
    15. Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1407-1418, September.
    16. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June.
    17. Daniel L. Chen & Martin Schonger & Chris Wickens, 2016. "oTree - An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments," Post-Print hal-04315125, HAL.
    18. Itai Ashlagi & Constantinos Daskalakis & Nima Haghpanah, 2023. "Sequential Mechanisms with Ex Post Individual Rationality," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 71(1), pages 245-258, January.
    19. Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717.
    20. David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1063-1080, December.
    21. Santiago R. Balseiro & Vahab S. Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme, 2018. "Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(11), pages 5062-5082, November.
    22. Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin & Wickens, Chris, 2016. "oTree—An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(C), pages 88-97.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George & Psomas, Alexandros & Rubinstein, Aviad, 2022. "On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 399-427.
    2. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
    3. Wei He, 2023. "Technical Note—Dynamic Mechanism Design with Capacity Constraint," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 71(5), pages 1610-1618, September.
    4. Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2025. "An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 82-94.
    5. Santiago R. Balseiro & Anthony Kim & Daniel Russo, 2021. "On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 1767-1783, November.
    6. Arve, Malin & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2023. "Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    7. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2022. "Progressive participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
    8. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 819-853.
    9. Di Corato, Luca & Moretto, Michele, 2026. "Dynamic Adverse Selection with Flow Limited Liability: A Closed-Form Approach to Price Regulation," FEEM Working Papers 396239, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    10. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2025. "Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(4), pages 1421-1453, June.
    11. Liu, Bin & Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2020. "Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    12. Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Points mechanisms and rewards programs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 436-457, June.
    13. Zhenyu Hu & Yangge Xiao, 2025. "Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Under Customer Search," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 73(4), pages 2045-2060, July.
    14. Bontems, Philippe & Calmette, Marie-Françoise & Martimort, David, 2026. "Highway to sell: How to renew concessions if you want it," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 45(C).
    15. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zijia, 2021. "Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    16. Philippe Bontems & Marie-Françoise Calmette & David Martimort, 2025. "Highway to Sell," Working Papers hal-05143577, HAL.
    17. Itai Ashlagi & Constantinos Daskalakis & Nima Haghpanah, 2023. "Sequential Mechanisms with Ex Post Individual Rationality," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 71(1), pages 245-258, January.
    18. Lu, Jingfeng & Zhao, Wenbo, 2026. "Intertemporal bundling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    19. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction," Papers 2106.04850, arXiv.org.
    20. Andrade, Rodrigo & Castro-Pires, Henrique & Moreira, Humberto, 2026. "The effect of exit rights on cost-based procurement contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 299-316.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:158:y:2026:i:c:p:1-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.