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The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2020. "Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.
  3. Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2015. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1795-1848, September.
  4. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
  5. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves," CARF F-Series CARF-F-386, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  6. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019. "Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-464, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  7. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
  8. Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_011_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  9. Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara, 2017. "Mechanism design with information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 783-812, March.
  10. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Shi, Xianwen, 2012. "Optimal auctions with information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 666-686.
  12. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  13. Matsushima, Hitoshi & Noda, Shunya, 2023. "Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
  14. Pancs, Romans, 2013. "Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 522-543.
  15. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
  16. , & ,, 2015. "Implementation with interdependent valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  17. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2026. "Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: An equivalence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  18. Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019. "Efficient investments in the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 247-278.
  19. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-415, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  21. Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Awaya, Yu & Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 41-59.
  23. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1057, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  24. Noda, Shunya, 2019. "Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
  25. Dirk Bergemann & Xianwen Shi & Juuso Valimaki, 2009. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Actions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 61-89, March.
  26. Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 118-141.
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