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Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Pierre Larouche & Florian Schuett, 2019. "Repeated interaction in standard setting," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 488-509, June.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
  3. Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, 2015. "An Empirical Examination Of Patent Holdup," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 549-578.
  4. David Martimort & Jean‐Christophe Poudou & Wilfried Sand‐Zantman, 2010. "Contracting For An Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 324-348, June.
  5. Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, 2014. "Conversation with secrets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 273-302, June.
  6. Marc Bourreau & Rafael C. de M. Ferraz & Yann Ménière, 2023. "Licensing standard‐essential patents with costly enforcement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 827-855, October.
  7. Anne Layne‐Farrar & Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2014. "Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 24-49, March.
  8. Gregor Langus & Vilen Lipatov & Damien Neven, 2013. "Standard-Essential Patents: Who Is Really Holding Up (And When)?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 253-284.
  9. Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, 2012. "Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Standards, Patents and Innovations, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
  11. Llanes, Gastón, 2024. "Innovation incentives in technical standards," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  12. Wipusanawan, Chayanin, 2020. "Standard-Essential Patents and Incentives for Innovation," Discussion Paper 2020-025, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  13. Jan Boone & Florian Schuett & Emanuele Tarantino, 2024. "Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(1), pages 3-19, March.
  14. Wipusanawan, Chayanin, 2020. "Standard-Essential Patents and Incentives for Innovation," Other publications TiSEM 9ea6a894-ac05-413d-8c2d-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Florian Schuett & Chayanin Wipusanawan, 2023. "Essentiality Checks for Standard Essential Patents," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 746861, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
  16. Horn, Henrik, 2020. "International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents," Working Paper Series 1314, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 13 Feb 2023.
  17. Jeon, Haejun & Nishihara, Michi, 2018. "Optimal patent policy in the presence of vertical separation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 270(2), pages 682-697.
  18. Wipusanawan, Chayanin, 2020. "Standard-Essential Patents and Incentives for Innovation," Discussion Paper 2020-034, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  19. Justus Baron & Jorge Contreras & Martin Husovec & Pierre Larouche, 2019. "Making the Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights," JRC Research Reports JRC115004, Joint Research Centre.
  20. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, 2018. "Mapping standards to patents using declarations of standard‐essential patents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 504-534, September.
  21. Love, Brian J. & Helmers, Christian, 2023. "Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
  22. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Emilio Raiteri & Rudi Bekkers, 2023. "Discrimination in the Patent System: Evidence from Standard-Essential Patents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(4), pages 739-763.
  23. Tarantino, Emanuele & Reisinger, Markus, 2016. "Patent Pools in Input Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Jay Pil Choi, 2016. "FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 233-250, July.
  25. Layne-Farrar, Anne & Llobet, Gerard, 2014. "Moving beyond simple examples: Assessing the incremental value rule within standards," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 57-69.
  26. Wipusanawan, Chayanin, 2023. "Standard-essential patents, innovation, and competition," Other publications TiSEM 292e319a-9e6a-4465-8f8f-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  27. Baron, Justus, 2020. "Counting standard contributions to measure the value of patent portfolios - A tale of apples and oranges," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(3).
  28. Wipusanawan, Chayanin, 2020. "Standard-Essential Patents and Incentives for Innovation," Other publications TiSEM 5bbcc50b-2497-43a4-bba6-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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