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Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Spaenjers, C., 2011. "Essays in alternative investments," Other publications TiSEM 8c51041f-6a63-451f-b7f4-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  2. Jarl G. Kallberg & Crocker H. Liu & Adam Nowak, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Double Round Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 531-555, June.
  3. Teich, Jeffrey E. & Wallenius, Hannele & Wallenius, Jyrki & Koppius, Otto R., 2004. "Emerging multiple issue e-auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 159(1), pages 1-16, November.
  4. Marleen Marra, 2020. "Sample Spacings for Identification: The Case of English Auctions with Absentee Bidding," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03878412, HAL.
  5. Jason Kuruzovich & Hila Etzion, 2018. "Online Auctions and Multichannel Retailing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2734-2753, June.
  6. Silvia Caserta & Casper G. de Vries, 2005. "Auctions with Numerous Bidders," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-031/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Garrett van Ryzin & Gustavo Vulcano, 2004. "Optimal Auctioning and Ordering in an Infinite Horizon Inventory-Pricing System," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 52(3), pages 346-367, June.
  8. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  9. Michael H. Rothkopf, 2007. "Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 191-197, April.
  10. Teich, J.E. & Wallenius, H. & Wallenius, J. & Koppius, O.R., 2003. "Emerging Multiple e-Auctions," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2003-058-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  11. Petr Očko, 2005. "Vymezení a aktuální problémy informační ekonomiky [Definition and topical problems of the information economy]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2005(3), pages 383-404.
  12. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
  13. Dimson, Elroy & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2011. "Ex post: The investment performance of collectible stamps," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 443-458, May.
  14. Wenchuan Liu & Yu Zhang & Qi Li, 2015. "A semiparametric varying coefficient model of monotone auction bidding processes," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 313-335, February.
  15. Chen, Yan & Takeuchi, Kan, 2010. "Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 557-579, March.
  16. Sean Gray & David H. Reiley, 2013. "Measuring the Benefits to Sniping on eBay: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 9(2), pages 137-152, July.
  17. Marta Stryszowska, 2004. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price," Working Papers 2004.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  18. Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2021. "Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test," Papers 2105.00204, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  19. David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 260-276, March.
  20. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 10076, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Step-Level Reasoning and Bidding in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1633-1642, November.
  23. De Liu & Adib Bagh, 2020. "Preserving Bidder Privacy in Assignment Auctions: Design and Measurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 3162-3182, July.
  24. Jay R Corrigan & Saleem Alhabash & Matthew Rousu & Sean B Cash, 2018. "How much is social media worth? Estimating the value of Facebook by paying users to stop using it," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(12), pages 1-11, December.
  25. Bernard, John C. & Zhang, Chao & Gifford, Katie, 2006. "An Experimental Investigation of Consumer Willingness to Pay for Non-GM Foods When an Organic Option Is Present," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 35(2), pages 1-12, October.
  26. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
  27. Charles Z. Zheng, 2016. "Goethe's secret reserve price," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 41-48, March.
  28. Mukherjee, Conan, 2015. "On Axioms Underlying Use of Reserve Price," Working Papers 2015:7, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 14 Apr 2015.
  29. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
  30. Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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