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Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2022. "Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 9801, CESifo.
  2. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2021. "Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation [Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(3), pages 1253-1278.
  3. Liang, Yong & Sun, Peng & Tang, Runyu & Zhang, Chong, 2023. "Efficient resource allocation contracts to reduce adverse events," Other publications TiSEM 0bcf44d9-d0ac-4231-beaf-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  4. Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
  5. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Luo, Robin Yifan & Michaeli, Beatrice, 2024. "In search of a unicorn: Dynamic agency with endogenous investment opportunities," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2).
  6. Emeric Henry & Marco Ottaviani, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 911-955, March.
  7. Curello, Gregorio & Sinander, Ludvig, 0. "Screening for breakthroughs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  8. Emeric Henry & Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: the Organization of Persuasion," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b9, Sciences Po.
  9. Yair Antler & Daniel Bird & Santiago Oliveros, 2023. "Sequential Learning," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 399-433, February.
  10. Christoph Carnehl & Marco Ottaviani & Justus Preusser, 2024. "Designing Scientific Grants," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, volume 4, pages 139-178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Shivam Gupta & Anupam Agrawal & Jennifer K. Ryan, 2023. "Agile contracting: Managing incentives under uncertain needs," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(3), pages 972-988, March.
  12. Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
  13. Okat, Deniz & Nash, John G.F., 2024. "Delegating trial and error," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
  14. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b94tafji6op8tlqs1 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 1022, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2019.
  16. Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael, 2023. "Organizational Capacity and Project Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 17817, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
  18. Altan, Baṣak, 2019. "Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
  19. Parilina, Elena M. & Zaccour, Georges, 2024. "Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games played over event trees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1200-1216.
  20. Zhaolin Li & Steven Q. Lu & Jennifer K. Ryan & Daewon Sun, 2021. "Impact of Organizational Structure on Development Strategy under Equity‐Based Incentives," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(4), pages 984-996, April.
  21. Peng Sun & Feng Tian, 2018. "Optimal Contract to Induce Continued Effort," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4193-4217, September.
  22. Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022. "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 534-552.
  23. Maxim Senkov, 2022. "Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp734, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  24. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
  25. McClellan, Andrew, 2025. "The dynamics of project standards," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  26. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2024. "Screening for Breakthroughs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_562, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  27. Feng Tian & Peng Sun & Izak Duenyas, 2021. "Optimal Contract for Machine Repair and Maintenance," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 916-949, May.
  28. Elena M. Parilina & Georges Zaccour, 2017. "Node-Consistent Shapley Value for Games Played over Event Trees with Random Terminal Time," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 236-254, October.
  29. Sadler, Evan, 2021. "Dead ends," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  30. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
  31. Yonggyun Kim & Francisco Poggi, 2025. "Strategic Concealment in Innovation Races," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_648, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  32. Beyer, Anne & Jeong, Junyoung, 2024. "The unicorn quest: Deriving empirical predictions from theory," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2).
  33. Christoph Carnehl & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "On Risk and Time Pressure: When to Think and When to Do," Papers 2111.07451, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
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