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Was tun, wenn man die Regierungsmacht verloren hat? Die SPD-Sozialpolitik in den 80er Jahren

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  • Gohr, Antonia

Abstract

1982 verlor die SPD die Regierungsverantwortung. Eine christliberale Koaltion kam an die Regierung, deren erklärte Absicht darin bestand, eine »Atempause« in der Sozialpolitik einzulegen. 1 Mehr Markt und weniger Staat 2 - das war die Maxime. Sozialstaatskritik kam in den 80er Jahren zunehmend auch von links. Von grün-alternativer Seite wurden sozialstaatliche Tendenzen der Bürokratisierung, Verrechtlichung, Intransparenz und Bürgerferne bemängelt und autonome Gestaltungsfreiheit und Selbsthilfe als Prinzipien selbstbestimmter sozialer Sicherheit gefordert. Sowohl die konservativ-liberale als auch die grün-alternative Sozialstaatskritik stellten traditionelle sozialdemokratische Sozialpolitikvorstellungen in Frage. Wie reagierte die Sozialstaatspartei SPD angesichts dieser Herausforderungen? Welche Oppositionsstrategien verfolgte sie auf dem Feld der Sozialpolitik? Die SPD-Opposition verfolgte in den 80er Jahren drei Strategien. Erstens kritisierte sie und wehrte die sozialpolitischen Kürzungsmaßnahmen der neuen Regierung ab. Zweitens versuchte sie eine Neukonzeption ihrer eigenen sozialpolitischen Programmatik, und drittens machte sie mit, indem sie bei einem großen Reformvorhaben - nämlich bei der Rentenreform '92 - mit der Regierungskoalition kooperierte. Ihre Oppositionsstrategien schwankten damit zwischen Ablehnung und Mitgestaltung. Die SPD-Sozialpolitik blieb in den 80er Jahren überwiegend Status quo-orientiert. Die Schwierigkeiten, die die Regierung Schröder Ende der 90er Jahre gerade bezüglich der Frage der sozialen Gerechtigkeit hat, können auch als Folge dieser Traditionsfixierung gewertet werden. In der Regierungsverantwortung müssen jetzt Kämpfe ausgetragen werden, die man in der Oppositionszeit nicht ausgefochten hat. Negativ kann die Bilanz jedoch nicht ausfallen. Obwohl sie sich auf dem Feld der Sozialpolitik wenig bewegte, konnte die SPD dennoch einiges erreichen. So setzte sie bei der Rentenreform '92 eigene Forderungen durch. Bewahren und Verteidigen war die sozialpolitische Leitlinie der SPD in den 80er Jahren. In diesem Sinne wirkte die SPD bei der Sozialpolitik der 80er Jahre indirekt mit, indem sie den oft als 'sozialdemokratisch' bezeichneten Blüm-Flügel gegen koalitionsinterne Kritiker aus CDU-Wirtschaftsrat und FDP stärkte.

Suggested Citation

  • Gohr, Antonia, 2000. "Was tun, wenn man die Regierungsmacht verloren hat? Die SPD-Sozialpolitik in den 80er Jahren," Working papers of the ZeS 05/2000, University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research (ZeS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zeswps:052000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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