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Vergütungsfindung auf dem stationären Pflegemarkt in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Bestandaufnahme und Alternativen

Author

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  • Wasem, Jürgen
  • Rothgang, Heinz
  • Greß, Stefan

Abstract

Im Januar 2002 hat der Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen die Enquetekommission "Situation und Zukunft der Pflege in NRW" eingerichtet. Die Kommission hatte den Auftrag, Antworten auf die Frage zu finden, welche Rahmenbedingungen das Land schaffen kann und welche Impulse es geben muss, um die Qualität der Pflege zu gewährleisten und auszubauen. Um diesem Auftrag gerecht zu werden, benötigte die Kommission u.a. Informationen über die Vergütung der gewerblich erbrachten Pflegeleistungen als einer wesentlichen Determinante der Qualität und Quantität der erbrachten Leistungen. Aus diesem Grund hatte sich die Enquetekommission darauf verständigt, eine Studie anfertigen zu lassen, in der für den stationären Bereich die derzeitigen Entgeltfindungsmechanismen beschrieben und bewertet, sowie Alternativen auf ihre relativen Vor- und Nachteile untersucht werden. Die Autoren haben es übernommen, eine derartige Studie anzufertigen, in der folgende Fragen behandelt werden sollen: 1. Wie läuft die Vergütungsfindung derzeit ab und welche Ergebnisse resultieren? 2. Welche Konsequenzen ergeben sich aus den so gesetzten Anreizen für das Verhalten der Einrichtungsträger? 3. Welche Alternativen zur Entgeltfindung gibt es grundsätzlich, welche Voraussetzungen erfordern diese Alternativen, welche Vor- und Nachteile sind damit verbunden und welche Ausgestaltungsoptionen sind zu bedenken?

Suggested Citation

  • Wasem, Jürgen & Rothgang, Heinz & Greß, Stefan, 2005. "Vergütungsfindung auf dem stationären Pflegemarkt in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Bestandaufnahme und Alternativen," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 144, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:udewwd:144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. A. Mirrlees, 1999. "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 3-21.
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    1. Hange, Ulrich, 2015. "The Market for Nursing Homes in Germany: a spatial competition approach," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112853, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Roman Mennicken & Boris Augurzky & Heinz Rothgang & Jürgen Wasem, 2014. "Explaining differences in remuneration rates of nursing homes in Germany," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 15(4), pages 401-410, May.

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