IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/sfb597/123.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The great chain of legitimacy: Justifying transnational democracy

Author

Listed:
  • Nullmeier, Frank
  • Pritzlaff, Tanja

Abstract

The idea of a 'chain of legitimation' is a central thought in German constitutional theory. However, the conception of a chain of legitimacy does not appear to be sufficient to justify transnational democracy. Starting from this diagnosis, the paper introduces an alternative conception of transnational legitimacy. In this conception, the layer of legitimacy provided by the chain of legitimation is complemented by a layer of legitimacy that is provided by political practices at the micro-level of the political process. Our conception of transnational legitimacy - which is based on a twofold concept of normativity that distinguishes between an explicit and an implicit dimension of normativity - presents a deeper understanding of where to locate the normative forces at play within the political process. The aim of the paper is to show that at the transnational level, democratic legitimacy can only emerge if the long and abstract legitimation chains are normatively backed by political practices that include explicit references to the will of the people as well as integrative, context-sensitive performances that prevent acts of exclusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Nullmeier, Frank & Pritzlaff, Tanja, 2010. "The great chain of legitimacy: Justifying transnational democracy," TranState Working Papers 123, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb597:123
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/36686/1/628599471.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomson, Robert & Torenvlied, René & Arregui, Javier, 2007. "The Paradox of Compliance: Infringements and Delays in Transposing European Union Directives," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(4), pages 685-709, October.
    2. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 379-406, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ruud van Druenen & Pieter Zwaan & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2022. "Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission: Explaining the Duration of Preliminary Investigations in the State Aid Notification Procedure," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 545-561, May.
    2. Carmona, Salvador & Donoso, Rafael & Walker, Stephen P., 2010. "Accounting and international relations: Britain, Spain and the Asiento treaty," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 252-273, February.
    3. Rana, Arslan Tariq & Kebewar, Mazen, 2014. "The Political Economy of FDI flows into Developing Countries: Does the depth of International Trade Agreements Matter?," EconStor Preprints 91501, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    4. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2016. "Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 547-567, December.
    5. Michael Zürn & Alexandros Tokhi & Martin Binder, 2021. "The International Authority Database," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(4), pages 430-442, September.
    6. Gabriele Spilker & Tobias Böhmelt, 2013. "The impact of preferential trade agreements on governmental repression revisited," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 343-361, September.
    7. Bayer, Patrick & Marcoux, Christopher & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2013. "Leveraging private capital for climate mitigation: Evidence from the Clean Development Mechanism," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 14-24.
    8. Oliver Westerwinter, 2021. "Transnational public-private governance initiatives in world politics: Introducing a new dataset," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 137-174, January.
    9. Jasper Krommendijk, 2015. "The domestic effectiveness of international human rights monitoring in established democracies. The case of the UN human rights treaty bodies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 489-512, December.
    10. Emily Hencken Ritter & Scott Wolford, 2012. "Bargaining and the effectiveness of international criminal regimes," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 149-171, April.
    11. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2021. "Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 591-610, December.
    12. Jon Hovi & Bjart Holtsmark, 2006. "Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 137-155, June.
    13. Matthew Fuhrmann, 2009. "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 181-208, April.
    14. Fitzmaurice Malgosia, 2018. "Environmental Compliance Control," Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics, Sciendo, vol. 8(2), pages 372-394, December.
    15. Asya Zhelyazkova & Nikoleta Yordanova, 2015. "Signalling ‘compliance’: The link between notified EU directive implementation and infringement cases," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 408-428, September.
    16. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Jana von Stein & Erik Gartzke, 2008. "International Organizations Count," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(2), pages 175-188, April.
    17. Heather A. D. Mbaye, 2001. "Why National States Comply with Supranational Law," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(3), pages 259-281, October.
    18. Stine Aakre & Leif Helland & Jon Hovi, 2016. "When Does Informal Enforcement Work?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(7), pages 1312-1340, October.
    19. Brian Lai & Dan Reiter, 2000. "Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(2), pages 203-227, April.
    20. Benin, Samuel, 2016. "Impacts of CAADP on Africa’s agricultural-led development," IFPRI discussion papers 1553, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb597:123. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zesbrde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.