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Appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration: A differential game of a claiming rush

  • Mohr, Ernst
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    This paper provides a model of natural resource exploration, where the sole motivation to explore arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competitors. It is assumed that private ownership rights over a finite unexplored and commonly held resource stock can be established through a costly deterministic exploration process. The open-loop and the feedback Nash equilibrium is analysed. It is shown that in between intervals of soaring exploratory activities there may be an interval where exploration is declining over time.

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    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/68874/1/68759524X.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Konstanz, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers, Series I with number 206.

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    Date of creation: 1985
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:206
    Contact details of provider: Postal: D-78457 Konstanz
    Phone: +49 7531 88 2314
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    Web page: http://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/

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    1. Arrow, Kenneth J. & Chang, Sheldon, 1982. "Optimal pricing, use, and exploration of uncertain natural resource stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-10, March.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1981. "The theory of exhaustible resources," Munich Reprints in Economics 19910, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1984. "Common Property Resources, Storage Facilities and Ownership Structures: A Cournot Model of the Oil Market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 51(23), pages 235-52, August.
    4. Pindyck, Robert S, 1980. "Uncertainty and Exhaustible Resource Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1203-25, December.
    5. Gilbert, Richard J, 1977. "Resource Extraction with Differential Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 250-54, February.
    6. Eswaran, Mukesh & Lewis, Tracy R, 1984. "Appropriability and the Extraction of a Common Property Resource," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 51(204), pages 393-400, November.
    7. Gilbert, Richard J, 1979. "Optimal Depletion of an Uncertain Stock," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 47-57, January.
    8. Deshmukh, Sudhakar D & Pliska, Stanley R, 1980. "Optimal Consumption and Exploration of Nonrenewable Resources under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(1), pages 177-200, January.
    9. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-73, February.
    10. John M. Hartwick, 1983. "Learning about and Exploiting Exhaustible Resource Deposits of Uncertain Size," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(3), pages 391-410, August.
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