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Fourth Branch Agencies: A Silver Bullet for Making Government Accountable?

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  • Gutmann, Jerg
  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

A new consensus appears to have emerged among academics and policy practitioners: Governments can be made to respect constitutional rules by establishing and constitutionally entrenching watchdogs, such as anti-corruption commissions, electoral commissions, or ombudspersons. In this article, we evaluate the consequences of what we propose to call the New York Consensus. We find that fourth branch agencies can increase constitutional compliance, but their effects are largely limited to higher income countries with a democratic political system.

Suggested Citation

  • Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2025. "Fourth Branch Agencies: A Silver Bullet for Making Government Accountable?," ILE Working Paper Series 88, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:88
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hanna Lerner & David Futscher Pereira & Nina Schlager, 2025. "International constitutional advising: Introducing a new dataset," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 669-699, September.
    2. Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg, 2013. "Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between property rights and judicial independence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 66-73.
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    4. Negretto, Gabriel L. & Sánchez-Talanquer, Mariano, 2021. "Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis, 1900–2015," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 522-536, May.
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    7. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2023. "Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 377-404, June.
    8. Jerg Gutmann & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Stefan Voigt, 2024. "The comparative constitutional compliance database," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-115, January.
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