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Zu den Wirtschaftssanktionen gegenüber Russland

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  • Gern, Klaus-Jürgen
  • Kamin, Katrin

Abstract

Sanktionen zielen in der Regel darauf ab, das Verhalten des sanktionierten Landes zu ändern. Die Ziele von Sanktionen reichen von der Beilegung von (gewaltsamen) Konflikten, Vermeidung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, der Förderung von Demokratisierung und Nichtverbreitung bis hin zu handels- oder industriepolitischen Fragen. Politisch gesehen können Sanktionen Regierungen stabilisieren oder destabilisieren, zu Machtverschiebungen innerhalb von Ländern führen und die politischen Beziehungen zwischen dem sanktionierenden Land und dem Zielland der Sanktion verändern.

Suggested Citation

  • Gern, Klaus-Jürgen & Kamin, Katrin, 2022. "Zu den Wirtschaftssanktionen gegenüber Russland," Kiel Insight 2022.01, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwbox:202201n
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/264859/1/IfW-Box-2022-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644150.
    2. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521643320.
    3. Matthieu Crozet & Julian Hinz, 2020. "Friendly fire: the trade impact of the Russia sanctions and counter-sanctions," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 35(101), pages 97-146.
    4. Chowdhry, Sonali & Felbermayr, Gabriel & Hinz, Julian & Kamin, Katrin & Jacobs, Anna-Katharina & Mahlkow, Hendrik, 2020. "The economic costs of war by other means," Kiel Policy Brief 147, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    Keywords

    Konjunktur; Konjunktur Welt;

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