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Glücksspielregulierung aus ordnungsökonomischer Perspektive

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  • Haucap, Justus

Abstract

Die Glücksspielregulierung der vergangenen 20 Jahre ist im Wesentlichen ein Lehrstück für politisches Versagen. Unter fortwährender Missachtung von Europa- und bisweilen auch Verfassungsrecht wurden zum einen Grundfreiheiten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger eingeschränkt, zum anderen gab es aber keinen wirksamen Jugend- und Spielerschutz. Insofern hat die Glückspielregulierung der vergangenen 20 Jahre - bedauerlicherweise - Gemeinsamkeiten viel mit der Corona-Politik in Deutschland. Der GlüStV 2021 formuliert Ziele, die sich gut auf Basis der ökonomischen Theorie des Marktversagens begründen und daraus ableiten lassen. Um diese Ziele effektiv zu erreichen, geht der GlüStV 2021 prinzipiell in die richtige Richtung. Eine weitgehend sachgerechte, europa- und verfassungsrechtskonforme Regulierung des Glücksspiels ist nun in Deutschland nach fast 20 Jahren rechtlicher Schwebezustände und blühender Schwarzmärkte zum Greifen nah, auch wenn die Regulierung im Hinblick auf Werberegeln, Spielprogramme, Einsatzlimits und anderes im Detail noch Schwächen aufweist. Umso wichtiger ist daher die regelmäßige Evaluation des regulatorischen Rahmens. Die regelmäßige Evaluation der Glücksspielregulierung sollte die neue Aufsichtsbehörde für das Glückspiel übernehmen. Zugleich ist zu empfehlen, angesichts der Dynamik des Glücksspielmarktes, der technologischen Entwicklungen und der Notwendigkeit, Regulierung immer wieder zu evaluieren, weniger Details im Glückspielstaatsvertrag auf Gesetzesebene vorzugeben, sondern besser der neuen Aufsichtsbehörde mehr Ermessen zuzugestehen und ggf. auch die rechtliche Kompetenz einzuräumen, selbst Verordnungen zu erlassen. Scheitern kann die gesamte Glücksspielregulierung schließlich - und darauf deute momentan einiges hin - an einer unsachgemäßen Besteuerung. Eine Spieleinsatzsteuer von 5,3 Prozent dürfte ein massives Abwandern von Spielerinnen und Spielern in den Schwarzmarkt induzieren. Bei allen Schwächen in den Details des GlüStV 2021 ist die überbordende Besteuerung eindeutig das gravierendste Problem, das den gesamten GlüStV 2021 letztlich auch zum Scheitern bringen kann. Hier besteht erheblicher Korrekturbedarf.

Suggested Citation

  • Haucap, Justus, 2021. "Glücksspielregulierung aus ordnungsökonomischer Perspektive," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 110, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:diceop:110
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    2. Fremerey, Melinda & Hüther, Michael, 2023. "Ordnungspolitik in Krisenzeiten: Eine ordnungspolitische Bewertung aktueller wirtschaftspolitischer Handlungsstränge," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 113, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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