IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure

Listed author(s):
  • Tarun Khanna


    (Competition & Strategy Unit)

  • Bharat N. Anand


    (Competition & Strategy Unit)

Property rights over knowledge and its output--intellectual property rights--are often weak. We treat the strength of property rights as a primitive of the environment. We examine the effects of the strengths of these rights on the structure of contracts and relationships employed by firms in intellectual property transfers. Variation in the adequacy of property rights across industries allows us to identify these effects. Using a unique dataset assembled for this purpose, we find that firms will structure contracts to optimally circumscribe the threat of imitators. In particular, weak property rights are associated with a lower absolute and relative incidence of licensing activity, fewer licensings of prospective technologies, a higher incidence of transfers to related parties and non-exclusive contracts, and more cross-licensings. The results are not explained by unobserved heterogeneity or jointness in a licenser's decisions concerning various contractual features.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm37.

in new window

Date of creation: 20 Nov 1996
Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm37
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm37. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.