Cooperative Prisoners and Aggressive Chickens: Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in 2x2 Games
By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners' dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma is often achieved, with 'reciprocal' preferences. In the chicken game a symmetric correlated strategy profile is played that is as efficient as the symmetric equilibrium. Among preferences only pure 'hawkish' preferences and 'selfish' preferences survive. With incomplete information, the symmetric equilibrium of the material payoff game is played. All types of preferences are present in the population in the medium run.
|Date of creation:||29 Jan 2002|
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|Note:||Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.|
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- Possajennikov, Alex, 2002.
"Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in Symmetric Games,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
02-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Alex Possajennikov, 2004. "Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences In Symmetric Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 227-263, November.
- Possajennikov, Alexandre, 2002. "Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences in symmetric games," Papers 02-03, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- A. J. Robson, 2010. "Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake," Levine's Working Paper Archive 540, David K. Levine.
- Possajennikov, Alex, 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-129, May.
- Bolle, Friedel, 2000. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable? And envy and malevolence?: Remarks on Bester and Guth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 131-133, May.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
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