Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distortionary Taxes: A Public Choice Approach
This paper seeks useful conditions relating individual preferences to willingness to support specific governmental tax-expenditure proposals. This discussion follows Wicksell in considering only tax-expenditure proposals that specifically tie expenditures to taxes that finance them.
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- Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Dasgupta, P, 1971.
"Differential Taxation, Public Goods and Economic Efficiency,"
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Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 151-74, April.
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- Atkinson, Anthony B & Stern, N H, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 119-28, January.
- Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-78, June.
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