"Friendships" in Vertical Relations
It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization or a vertical structure creates efficiency losses, and hence should be prevented. This paper shows that whenever collusion takes the form of co-insurance agreements, here called `friendships', among the members of a vertical structure this may not be the case. Indeed, in such a case, collusion yields only a redistribution of surplus among the members of the vertical structure. Hence, its efficiency costs may be reduced by allowing these `friendships' to take place, rather than preventing them, and accounting for the redistribution in the design of the optimal incentive scheme.
|Date of creation:||21 Sep 1996|
|Date of revision:||21 Sep 1996|
|Note:||Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript 300DPI; pages: 25 ; figures: included|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1988. "Fairness and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 44-49, May.
- L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
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