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Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules

  • Richard Cornes

    (Nottingham University)

  • Roger Hartley

    (Keele University)

We study Nash equilibria of joint production games under a mixed output sharing rule in which part of the output (the mixing parameter) is shared in proportion to inputs and the rest according to exogenously determined shares. This rule includes proportional sharing and equal sharing as special cases. We show that this game has a unique equilibrium and discuss comparative statics. When the game is large, players unanimously prefer the same value of the mixing parameter: the equilibrium value of the elasticity of production. For this value, equilibrium input and output are fully efficient. Our approach exploits the fact that payoffs in the joint production game are a function only of a player's input and the aggregate input and has indepen-dent interest as it readily extends to other "aggregative games".

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0211003.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 05 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0211003
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on pc; pages: 39
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