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Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules

Author

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  • Hartley, Roger

    (Keele University)

  • Richard Cornes

Abstract

We study joint production games under a mixed sharing rule in which part of the ouput (the mixing parameter) is shared in proportion to inputs and the rest according to exogenously determined shares. We show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium and discuss comparative statics. When the game is large, we show that players unanimously prefer the same value of the mixing parameter: the equilibrium elasticity of production. At this value, the equilibrium allocation is fully efficient. Our approach heavily exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on a player's input and the aggregate input.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartley, Roger & Richard Cornes, 2003. "Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 99, Royal Economic Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:99
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:17:y:2015:i:01:n:s021919891540006x is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dickson, Alex & Hartley, Roger, 2008. "The strategic Marshallian cross," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 514-532, November.
    3. R Cornes & R Hartley, 2005. "The Geometry of Aggregative Games," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0514, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    4. A. Dickson & R. Hartley, 2005. "The strategic Marshallian cross and bilateral oligopoly," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0523, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    5. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2012. "Fully aggregative games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 631-633.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    production externalities; non-cooperative games;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

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