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The Labour Market Development of Oberwart and the Socio-Economic Situation of the Roma

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  • Thomas Leoni

Abstract

The Oberwart district – as well as the Burgenland as a whole – continues to face serious challenges on the labour market. The creation of employment has been more dynamic than in the remainder of Austria, however, neither in the Burgenland nor in Oberwart could the increase in the labour supply be absorbed. While the service industry has expanded considerably and generated many jobs, the traditional manufacturing industries have shrunk at a fast pace. This development has hit women more severely than men: the job losses in the textile and electrical equipment industries have not been offset by job gains in the tourism sector. In general, it is the group of low-skilled workers that faces the most difficult situation. This finding applies to the whole population of Oberwart; it is, however, particularly significant for the local Roma community.
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  • Thomas Leoni, 2004. "The Labour Market Development of Oberwart and the Socio-Economic Situation of the Roma," WIFO Working Papers 226, WIFO.
  • Handle: RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2004:i:226
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