IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Contrasting future paths for an evolving global climate regime


  • Barrett, Scott
  • Toman, Michael


This paper explores two different conceptions of how an emerging climate regime might evolve to strengthen incentives for more vigorous cooperation in mitigating global climate change. One is the paradigm that has figured most prominently in negotiations to this point: the establishment of targets and timetables for countries to limit their aggregate greenhouse gas emissions. The other approach consists of a variety of loosely coordinated smaller scale agreements, each one of which addresses a different aspect of the challenge, and is enforced in its own way. The primary conclusion is that an agreement of the first type may be more cost-effective, but that a system of agreements of the second type would likely sustain more abatement overall.

Suggested Citation

  • Barrett, Scott & Toman, Michael, 2010. "Contrasting future paths for an evolving global climate regime," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5164, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5164

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Luke Kemp, 2015. "A climate treaty without the US Congress: Using executive powers to overcome the 'Ratification Straitjacket'," CCEP Working Papers 1513, Centre for Climate & Energy Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    2. Nilsson, Måns & Persson, Åsa, 2012. "Reprint of “Can Earth system interactions be governed? Governance functions for linking climate change mitigation with land use, freshwater and biodiversity protection”," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 10-20.
    3. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
    4. Elisabeth Gsottbauer & Jeroen den Bergh, 2013. "Bounded rationality and social interaction in negotiating a climate agreement," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 225-249, September.
    5. Stephen Chaudoin & David Smith & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "American evangelicals and domestic versus international climate policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 441-469, December.
    6. Michael Mehling, 2012. "Alternative Frameworks for International Climate Cooperation: Towards a Systematic Assessment Matrix," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 44538, January.
    7. repec:unu:wpaper:wp2012-072 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Mattoo, Aaditya & Subramanian, Arvind, 2012. "Equity in Climate Change: An Analytical Review," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1083-1097.
    9. Nilsson, Måns & Persson, Åsa, 2012. "Can Earth system interactions be governed? Governance functions for linking climate change mitigation with land use, freshwater and biodiversity protection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 61-71.
    10. Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "A model of dynamic climate governance: dream big, win small," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 107-125, May.
    11. Jingjing He & Yongfu Huang & Finn Tarp, 2014. "Has the Clean Development Mechanism assisted sustainable development?," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 0(4), pages 248-260, November.
    12. World Bank & United Nations, 2010. "Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters : The Economics of Effective Prevention," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2512, December.
    13. William R. Moomaw & Rishikesh Ram Bhandary & Laura Kuhl & Patrick Verkooijen, 2017. "Sustainable Development Diplomacy: Diagnostics for the Negotiation and Implementation of Sustainable Development," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8(1), pages 73-81, February.
    14. Kemp, Luke, 2015. "A climate treaty without the US Congress: Using executive powers to overcome the ‘Ratification Straitjacket’," Working Papers 249518, Australian National University, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy.

    More about this item


    Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases; Climate Change Economics; Montreal Protocol; Environmental Economics&Policies; Transport Economics Policy&Planning;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.