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Thresholds for the Scrutiny of Mergers and the Problem of Joint Dominance

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  • Quigley, Neil
  • Evans, Lewis
  • Hughes, Patrick

Abstract

In this Report we consider:1. How the potential for tacit and explicit collusion associated with joint dominance can best be assessed in merger applications.2. Whether the inclusion in section 47 of the Commerce Act of the competition test proposed above in place of the existing dominance test will provide an efficient and effective means of identifying markets where tacit collusion is likely to result from joint dominance.3. Whether the evidence from Canada and the USA (where a substantial lessening of competition test is applied to mergers) supports the claim that the test proposed by the Ministry of Commerce is superior to one of pure dominance in respect of identifying joint dominance (oligopoly) problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Quigley, Neil & Evans, Lewis & Hughes, Patrick, 1999. "Thresholds for the Scrutiny of Mergers and the Problem of Joint Dominance," Working Paper Series 19025, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    • Handle: RePEc:vuw:vuwcsr:19025
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    File URL: https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/19025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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