Positional Goods: A Diagrammatic Exposition
Positional good shares with public good the non-private characteristic of consumption: for a positional good, given the consumption choice of one party, the other(s) must consume a corresponding negative amount of what the first party chooses to consume. Therefore, we treat positional good in a diagrammatic illustration similar to the Samuelsonian criteria for the public good. The aim of this work is to introduce the implications for this in terms of Pareto efficiency
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- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
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