IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/uea/ueaccp/2007_02.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Just Enough: Empowering Fixed-Line Telecommunications Consumers through a Quality of Service Information System

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick D. M. Barrow

    (Centre for Competition Policy and School of Computing Sciences, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

Information, it is said, is power, and the proliferation of web-based information systems (IS) has made the potential for empowerment by information available to an increasingly large user population. The empowerment of consumers through quality of service information is a key component of modern UK economic and competition policy in order to both resolve certain information asymmetries between traders and consumers and facilitate switching, i.e. the ability of consumers to switch suppliers of goods and services. Using a case study approach, this paper concentrates not on the intricacies, physical design or specific information content of the IS itself but on the regulatory approach taken by the UK telecommunications regulator, Ofcom, to provide it. It considers how the mechanisms set up to provide and audit appropriate, comparable and reliable information actually favour the interests of the traders rather than the consumers. The result is that those people at whom such information is undoubtedly aimed (consumers) and who need it to make rational choices in the market are actually disempowered, particularly those vulnerable groups who may have special information requirements. It concludes that if consumers are to be properly empowered by information in such systems, the regulator must do more to better protect the consumer interest and provide them with information they actually need and not the information that the traders are willing to provide.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick D. M. Barrow, 2007. "Just Enough: Empowering Fixed-Line Telecommunications Consumers through a Quality of Service Information System," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-02, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2007_02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/ccp/CCP-07-02.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2009. "Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 427-452, March.
    2. Michael Harker & Laurence Mathieu & Catherine Waddams Price, 2006. "Regulation and Consumer Representation," Chapters, in: Michael A. Crew & David Parker (ed.), International Handbook on Economic Regulation, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Michael A. Crew & David Parker (ed.), 2006. "International Handbook on Economic Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3330.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Xavier & Dimitri Ypsilanti, 2010. "Behavioral Economics and Telecommunications Policy," Chapters, in: Anastassios Gentzoglanis & Anders Henten (ed.), Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anindya Ghose & Avi Goldfarb & Sang Pil Han, 2013. "How Is the Mobile Internet Different? Search Costs and Local Activities," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 613-631, September.
    2. Hu, Li & Ma, Hoi-Lam & Wang, Li & Liu, Yang, 2023. "Hiding or disclosing? Information discrimination in member-only discounts," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    3. Eduardo Perez & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Working Papers hal-03583827, HAL.
    4. Tobias Gesche, 2022. "Reference‐price shifts and customer antagonism: Evidence from reviews for online auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 558-578, August.
    5. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2017. "Search and Obfuscation in a Technologically Changing Retail Environment: Some Thoughts on Implications and Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 18, pages 1-25, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mountain, Bruce R., 2019. "Ownership, regulation, and financial disparity: The case of electricity distribution in Australia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    7. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    8. Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L. & Wildenbeest, Matthijs R., 2011. "Comparison sites," IESE Research Papers D/933, IESE Business School.
      • Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez & Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, 2011. "Comparison Sites," Working Papers 2011-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    9. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Köster, Mats & Sutter, Matthias, 2020. "To buy or not to buy? Price salience in an online shopping field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    10. Andreas Leibbrandt, 2016. "Behavioral Constraints on Pricing: Experimental Evidence on Price Discrimination and Customer Antagonism," CESifo Working Paper Series 6214, CESifo.
    11. Hackl, Franz & Kummer, Michael E. & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf & Zulehner, Christine, 2014. "Market structure and market performance in E-commerce," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 199-218.
    12. Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
    13. Michael R. Baye & John Morgan & Patrick Scholten, 2004. "Price Dispersion In The Small And In The Large: Evidence From An Internet Price Comparison Site," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 463-496, December.
    14. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2004. "The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing," Working Papers 04-07, NET Institute.
    15. Øystein Foros & Mai Nguyen-Ones & Frode Steen, 2021. "The Effects of a Day off from Retail Price Competition: Evidence on Consumer Behavior and Firm Performance in Gasoline Retailing," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 49-87, January.
    16. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023. "The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 187-226, May.
    17. Glenn Ellison, 2005. "A Model of Add-On Pricing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(2), pages 585-637.
    18. Hämäläinen, Saara, 2018. "Competitive search obfuscation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 38-63.
    19. Chioveanu, Ioana & Zhou, Jidong, 2009. "Price Competition and Consumer Confusion," MPRA Paper 17340, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Michael Grubb, 2015. "Failing to Choose the Best Price: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(3), pages 303-340, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2007_02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Juliette Hardmad (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esueauk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.