Procedural Justice and Political Risk
We examine how ideological affiliations affect individuals’ perceptions of fairness in scenarios where they control an allocation of money for themselves and another, unknown person. Are notions of equity guided by the fairness of distribution, or is the overall outcome less important than having democratic procedures that allow individuals a voice in the allocation process? We design an experimental bargaining game in which subjects have the ability to allocate both money and power between themselves and another unknown individual. We find that liberals are more likely to enact fair outcomes, but conservatives are more likely to share decision-making rights while being less financially generous. However, we find that the tendency to select one form of fairness over another is not only driven by the type of ideology, but also by perceived spatial distance from others’ ideology: respondents with the greatest perceived ideological distance from others were significantly less likely to concede power and preferred to dictate allocations. JEL Classification: Key words:
|Date of creation:||Oct 2016|
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- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
- Christopher Carman, 2010. "The Process is the Reality: Perceptions of Procedural Fairness and Participatory Democracy," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58, pages 731-751, October.
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