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The Price of Stability in Matching Markets

Author

Listed:
  • James W. Boudreau

    (The University of Texas-Pan American)

  • Vicki Knoblauch

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

This paper studies the inefficiency of one-to-one matching markets as measured by the price of stability. We begin by providing some theoretical upper bounds on this type of inefficiency, bounds that vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to simulation experiments to further describe how changes in basic characteristics of agents’ preferences can increase or decrease the efficiency of stable matchings. Our results have important implications for those who seek to improve the functioning of real-world matching markets. Though it may be difficult or even impossible to completely ascertain preferences in a real-world market, it is possible to get a sense of general levels of correlation and intercorrelation from an empirical sample. Our results can then be of help to market designers, letting them know how substantial the price of stability is likely to be.

Suggested Citation

  • James W. Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2010. "The Price of Stability in Matching Markets," Working papers 2010-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2010-16
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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