A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits when Care is Bilateral
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- Miceli Thomas J., 2008. "A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits when Care is Bilateral," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 373-382, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," NBER Working Papers 3634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
Keywords
Accidents; deterrence; lawsuits; litigation costs; social versus private value;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAW-2008-04-29 (Law and Economics)
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