IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/uac/somwps/021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Game theoretic analysis of the mattel-Radica acquisiton

Author

Listed:
  • González, Maximiliano

    (School of Management, Universidad de los Andes)

  • Mayorca, María

    (Economics, Universidad del Rosario)

  • Vera, Alejandro

    (Economics, Universidad del Rosario)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we analyze the recent Mattel-Radica acquisition within the Gans and Stern (2000) game-theoretic model; and second, we argued that this case-study analysis is useful to add to the M&A literature a new dimension: technology and knowledge as a bargaining tool. The case-study approach used here allows us to provide a general framework to better understand M&A in the "market of ideas"

Suggested Citation

  • González, Maximiliano & Mayorca, María & Vera, Alejandro, 2008. "Game theoretic analysis of the mattel-Radica acquisiton," Galeras. Working Papers Series 021, Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:uac:somwps:021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/46377/Galeras-de-administraci%C3%B3n-21.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lerner, Josh & Merges, Robert P, 1998. "The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 125-156, June.
    2. Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, 1998. "The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 125-156, June.
    3. Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, 2000. "Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 485-511, December.
    4. Bittlingmayer, George & Hazlett, Thomas W., 2000. "DOS Kapital: Has antitrust action against Microsoft created value in the computer industry?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 329-359, March.
    5. Pankaj Ghemawat & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "The Devolution of Declining Industries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 167-186.
    6. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The Management of Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson & Scott Stern, 1999. "Balancing Incentives: The Tension Between Basic and Applied Research," NBER Working Papers 6882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2008. "The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(5), pages 982-997, May.
    3. Marx, Matt & Hsu, David H., 2015. "Strategic switchbacks: Dynamic commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1815-1826.
    4. Arora, Ashish & Gambardella, Alfonso, 2010. "The Market for Technology," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 641-678, Elsevier.
    5. Gans, Joshua S. & Stern, Scott, 2003. "The product market and the market for "ideas": commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 333-350, February.
    6. Carolin Haeussler & Matthew J. Higgins, 2012. "Explaining Preferences for Control Rights in Strategic Alliances: A Property Rights and Capabilities Perspective Approach," NBER Working Papers 18364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Markus Solf, 2004. "Unternehmenskooperationen als Folge von Informations- und Kommunikations-technologieveränderungen: Eine theoretische Analyse," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 146-167, March.
    8. Pedro Mendi, 2005. "The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 403-429, June.
    9. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2000. "Organizational Design of R & D Activities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0190, Econometric Society.
    10. Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2002. "When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 571-586, Winter.
    11. Figueroa, Nicolás & Serrano, Carlos J., 2019. "Patent trading flows of small and large firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(7), pages 1601-1616.
    12. Joshua Gans & Scott Stern, 2003. "When does funding research by smaller firms bear fruit?: Evidence from the SBIR program," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 361-384.
    13. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno, 2019. "One lab, two firms, many possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 260-283.
    14. Higgins, Matthew J., 2007. "The allocation of control rights in pharmaceutical alliances," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 58-75, March.
    15. Devarakonda, Ramakrishna & Reuer, Jeffrey J. & Tadikonda, Harsha, 2022. "Founder social capital and value appropriation in R&D alliance agreements," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(4).
    16. Carlos J. Serrano, 2010. "The dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 686-708, December.
    17. Hiroyuki Okamuro & Junichi Nishimura, 2013. "Impact of university intellectual property policy on the performance of university-industry research collaboration," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 273-301, June.
    18. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2007. "Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development," EAG Discussions Papers 200707, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    19. Umit Ozmel & Deniz Yavuz & Jeffrey J. Reuer & Todd Zenger, 2017. "Network Prominence, Bargaining Power, and the Allocation of Value Capturing Rights in High-Tech Alliance Contracts," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(5), pages 947-964, October.
    20. Henkel, Joachim & Rønde, Thomas & Wagner, Marcus, 2015. "And the winner is—Acquired. Entrepreneurship as a contest yielding radical innovations," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 295-310.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers and acquisition; game theory; case study;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uac:somwps:021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rodrigo Taborda (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/faandco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.