Retaliation and the Role for Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation
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- Irenaeus Wolff, 2012. "Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation," TWI Research Paper Series 75, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, UniversitÃ¤t Konstanz.
- Irenaeus Wolff, 2012. "Retaliation and the Role for Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-13, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
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KeywordsPublic goods; Prisoner's Dilemma; Strong reciprocity; Counterpunishment;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-10-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-10-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-10-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-10-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-10-13 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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