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On Cournot Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Khadidja Benallou

    (Phd student - UFR de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS, UMR 6211)

  • Daniel Danau

    (UFR de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS, UMR 6211)

  • Abderrahmane Ziad

    (UFR de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS, UMR 6211)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the existence of a Cournot equilibrium in a n- firm Cournot market for a single homogeneous commodity. Using a simple argument and proof, it shows that a Cournot equilibrium exists if each firm's marginal revenue declines with its own output and some weak non-decreasing incremental cost condition is satisfied.

Suggested Citation

  • Khadidja Benallou & Daniel Danau & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2012. "On Cournot Markets," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201219, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201219
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amir, Rabah, 2005. "Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity: The case of Cournot oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-14, October.
    2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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