Anticompetitive bundling when buyers compete
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- Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, 2024. "Anticompetitive Bundling When Buyers Compete," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 293-328, February.
- de Cornière, Alexandre & Taylor, Greg, 2023. "Anticompetitive bundling when buyers compete," TSE Working Papers 23-1403, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2023-02-27 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2023-02-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2023-02-27 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-IND-2023-02-27 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2023-02-27 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2023-02-27 (Regulation)
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