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Price Parity Clauses and Platform Data Acquisition

Author

Listed:
  • Enache, Andreea
  • Rhodes, Andrew

Abstract

Many platforms have used a Price Parity Clause (PPC) to prevent sellers charging lower prices on other sales channels. PPCs are often considered anti-competitive and have been banned in some jurisdictions. We provide a novel rationale—centered on how PPCs affect platforms’ data acquisition—for why a complete ban on PPCs may harm buyers and sellers.

Suggested Citation

  • Enache, Andreea & Rhodes, Andrew, 2025. "Price Parity Clauses and Platform Data Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 25-1661, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:130889
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, 2015. "Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(3), pages 1283-1328.
    2. Øystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind & Greg Shaffer, 2017. "Apple's agency model and the role of most-favored-nation clauses," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(3), pages 673-703, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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