Tax Compliance Social Norms and Institutional Quality: An Evolutionary Theory of Public Good Provision
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- L. S. Di Mauro & A. Pluchino & A. E. Biondo, 2018. "A Game of Tax Evasion: evidences from an agent-based model," Papers 1809.08146, arXiv.org.
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KeywordsTaxation; Tax compliance; Social norms Public goods; Government waste;
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2014-11-07 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-EVO-2014-11-07 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2014-11-07 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2014-11-07 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2014-11-07 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-UPT-2014-11-07 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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