Sex Ratios, Divorce Laws and the Marriage Market
We show how an interaction between the skewness of the sex ratio and the jump in divorce rates after a liberalization in divorce laws can obtain in a model of marriage market matching with non-transferable utility. This model is partly motivated by a significant cross-country correlation between these two variables. We also find that men’s hopes or fears about women’s marriage market odds are self-confirming under mutual consent, resulting in multiple equilibria. The multiplicity vanishes with a more skewed sex ratio or a liberalization of divorce laws. Our work sheds some light on the possible implications of divorce liberalization and pro-marriage policies.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2010|
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|Publication status:||Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series|
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- Fella, Giulio & Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2002.
"Does Divorce Law Matter?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
439, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Lena Edlund, 1999. "Son Preference, Sex Rations, and Marriage Patterns," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1275-1304, December.
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