Bayesian Nash Equilibria with a Provision Point: An Experimental Test
This paper extends theory and experimentation in the context of two parties in a group who contribute to a public good with a provision point. This study analyzes the voluntary contributions game in which a public good is provided if and only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds a threshold. I analyze several Bayesian Nash equilibria in this game and examine their efficiency implications. In an experimental test of a public-goods problem with a threshold and rebate, the observed behavior of the subjects generally was consistent with a linear bidding strategy in which bids increased with realized valuation. Further, the behavior of some subjects was sensitive to changes in the prior distribution of valuations and the relative cost of the public good.
|Date of creation:||03 Apr 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (732) 932-7482
Fax: (732) 932-7416
Web page: http://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/rutgers-wplist.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,"
469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, 1981.
"The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,"
470, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Harrison, Glenn W & McKee, Michael, 1985. "Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 653-70, October.
- R. Isaac & David Schmidtz & James Walker, 1989. "The assurance problem in a laboratory market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 217-236, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:199618. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.