IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rsc/rsceui/2009-27.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Privatization, Regulation And Airport Pricing: An Empirical Analysis For Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Germà Bel
  • Xavier Fageda

Abstract

This paper examines factors determining prices that airports charge to airlines. Using data for 100 large airports in Europe, we find that they charge higher prices when they move more passengers. Additionally, competition from other transport modes and other nearby airports imposes some discipline on the pricing behavior of airports. Low-cost carriers and airlines with a high market share seem to have a stronger countervailing power. Finally, we find that private airports not regulated charge higher prices than public or regulated airports. From our analysis, we can infer that market power of each airport is dependent upon its specific characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Germà Bel & Xavier Fageda, 2009. "Privatization, Regulation And Airport Pricing: An Empirical Analysis For Europe," RSCAS Working Papers 2009/27, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2009/27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/11561
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Faulhaber, Gerald R., 2006. "The future of wireless telecommunications: Spectrum as a critical resource," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 256-271, September.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    3. Gruber, Harald, 2001. "Spectrum limits and competition in mobile markets: the role of licence fees," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 59-70, February.
    4. Tilman Börgers & Christian Dustmann, 2003. "Awarding telecom licences: the recent European experience," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 18(36), pages 215-268, April.
    5. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", pages 112-134.
    6. McDonald, John F & Moffitt, Robert A, 1980. "The Uses of Tobit Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(2), pages 318-321, May.
    7. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    8. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King & Julian Wright, 2005. "Wireless Communications," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-45, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    9. Gandal, Neil & Salant, David & Waverman, Leonard, 0. "Standards in wireless telephone networks," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5-6), pages 325-332, June.
    10. Gruber,Harald, 2005. "The Economics of Mobile Telecommunications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521843270, December.
    11. Harald Gruber, 2002. "Endogenous Sunk Costs in the Market for Mobile Telecommunications - The Role of Licence Fees," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(1), pages 55-64.
    12. Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1996. "Reserve Prices without Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-164, August.
    13. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    14. McMillan, John, 1995. "Why auction the spectrum?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-199, April.
    15. S. Illeris & G. Akehurst, 2002. "Introduction," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 1-3, January.
    16. Hazlett, Thomas W, 1998. "Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 529-575, October.
    17. L. Cartelier, 2003. "Auctions Versus Beauty Contests: The Allocation of UMTS Licences in Europe," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 63-85, March.
    18. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cruz, Carlos Oliveira & Marques, Rui Cunha, 2011. "Contribution to the study of PPP arrangements in airport development, management and operation," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 392-400, March.
    2. repec:eee:trapol:v:61:y:2018:i:c:p:123-131 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Germá Bel & Xavier Fageda, 2011. "La reforma del modelo de gestión de aeropuertos en España: ¿Gestión conjunta o individual?," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 196(1), pages 109-130, january.
    4. Pavlyuk, Dmitry, 2016. "Implication of spatial heterogeneity for airports' efficiency estimation," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 15-24.
    5. Alcobendas, Miguel-Angel, 2014. "Airline–airport agreements in the San Francisco Bay Area: Effects on airline behavior and congestion at airports," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 58-79.
    6. Fischer, Justina A.V., 2012. "The choice of domestic policies in a globalized economy: Extended Version," MPRA Paper 37816, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatization; regulation; pricing; air transportation; airports;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2009/27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RSCAS web unit). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/rsiueit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.