IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Matching, Repeated Game and Aspiration


  • Akihiko Matsui

    (University of Tokyo)

  • In-Koo Cho

    (University of Illinois)


In general symmetric games with a pure symmetric efficient state (Karadika, Mookherjee, Ray and Vega-Rodondo [1998]), the long term relationship becomes pervasive if the society has a large number of players and the probability of exogenous termination of long term relationship is small. At any point of time, almost all players are engaged in the long term relationship, playing the symmetric efficient outcome, which is a natural focal point (Schelling [1960]). Although the players are heterogeneous, the decision to continue the long term relationship is based on the identical criterion asymptotically: players choose to continue the long term relationship if and only if the payoff is not below the payoff from the pure symmetric efficient state. A uniform social norm arises through decentralized matching process in combination with the repeated interactions among heterogeneous players.

Suggested Citation

  • Akihiko Matsui & In-Koo Cho, 2008. "Matching, Repeated Game and Aspiration," 2008 Meeting Papers 75, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:75

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519.
    2. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2006. "Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-415, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Bendor Jonathan & Mookherjee Dilip & Ray Debraj, 2001. "Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed008:75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.