A Spatial Econometric Analysis of the Effect of Vertical Restraints and Branding on Retail Gasoline Pricing
This paper builds an econometric model of retail gas competition to explain the pricing decisions of retail outlets in terms of vertical management structures, input costs and the characteristics of the local market they operate within. The model is estimated using price data from retail outlets from the South-Eastern Queensland region in Australia, but the generic nature of the model means that the results will be of general interest. The results indicate that when the cost of crude oil and demographic variations across different localities are accounted for, branding (i.e. whether the retail outlet is affiliated with one of the major brand distributers - Shell, Caltex, Mobil or BP) has a statistically significant positive effect on prices at nearby retail outlets. Conversely, the presence of an independent (non-branded) retailer within a locality has the effect of lowering retail prices. Furthermore, the results of this research show that service stations participating in discount coupon schemes with the two major retail supermarket chains have the effect of largely off-setting the price increase derived from branding affiliation. While, branding effects are not fully cancelled out, the overall effect is that prices are still higher than if branding did not occur.
|Date of creation:||27 Aug 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 07 3138 5066|
Fax: 07 3138 1500
Web page: http://www.ncer.edu.au
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632.
- G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring.
- Gerhard Clemenz & Klaus Gugler, 2006. "Locational choice and price competition: some empirical results for the austrian retail gasoline market," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 291-312, June.
- Gerhard Clemenz & Klaus Gugler, 2002. "Locational choice and price competition: Some empirical results for the Austrian retail gasoline market," Vienna Economics Papers 0206, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, 2004. "Supermarkets and Shopper Dockets: The Australian Experience," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 37(3), pages 311-316, 09.
- Beard, T Randolph & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 2001. "Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-333, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qut:auncer:2012_9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (School of Economics and Finance)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.