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Campaign Advertising, Redistribution And The Gap Between Incomes Of Rich And Poor

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Usher

    (Department of Economics, Queen's University)

Abstract

The effect of a widening of the distribution of income upon societyÂ’s choice of the amount of redistribution is a balancing of two opposing forces: the increase in redistribution in response to the increased ratio of mean to median income and the decrease in response to the greater advertising advantage of the wealthier half of the population. One cannot say a priori which forcepredominates.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Usher, 2011. "Campaign Advertising, Redistribution And The Gap Between Incomes Of Rich And Poor," Working Paper 1279, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1279
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1279.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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