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Campaign Advertising, Redistribution and the Gap between Incomes of Rich and Poor

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  • Usher, Dan

Abstract

The effect of a widening of the distribution of income upon society’s choice of the amount of redistribution is a balancing of two opposing forces: the increase in redistribution in response to the increased ratio of mean to median income and the decrease in response to the greater advertising advantage of the wealthier half of the population. One cannot say a priori which force predominates.

Suggested Citation

  • Usher, Dan, 2011. "Campaign Advertising, Redistribution and the Gap between Incomes of Rich and Poor," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274077, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:quedwp:274077
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274077
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1993. "A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(4), pages 941-964.
    2. David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
    3. Stefano DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, 2007. "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(3), pages 1187-1234.
    4. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, September.
    5. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    6. Paul Freedman & Michael Franz & Kenneth Goldstein, 2004. "Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 723-741, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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