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A new justification for full reserve banking?

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  • Musgrave, Ralph S.

Abstract

Most of the money in circulation is created by commercial banks, and it is precisely that form of money creation that explains most bank failures. In contrast, full reserve banking is a system under which that form of money is banned: all money is created by the central bank. There is a very simple reason for such a ban which most if not all advocates of full reserve seem to have missed, which is as follows. Under the existing bank system, those who deposit money at banks with a view to their bank lending on their money so as to earn interest are into commerce, in just the same way as where they deposit money with a stock-broker, mutual fund, private pension scheme or similar with a view to their money being loaned on or invested. And it is a widely accepted principle that taxpayers should not rescue commercial ventures which fail. Yet taxpayer backed deposit insurance is provided for those bank depositors. Thus if the latter principle were adhered to consistently, then there would be no deposit insurance for “interest earning” deposits, while of course totally safe non-interest earning deposits would be available for those who want them. And that “two types of deposit” system is what full reserve has always consisted of. The above point about commercial and non-commercial depositors is similar to, but not quite the same as the more conventional argument for full reserve, which is along the lines that governments cannot allow a series of major bank failures, which inevitably means banks are featherbedded or subsidised (a non-commercial activity) thus some way must be found of removing that subsidy, and one way is full reserve. The first 1,300 or so words below briefly introduce full reserve. The basic argument put in this paper then starts under the heading “Taxpayers should not back commerce.”

Suggested Citation

  • Musgrave, Ralph S., 2018. "A new justification for full reserve banking?," MPRA Paper 90041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:90041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ronnie Phillips, 1992. "Credit Markets and Narrow Banking," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_77, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Musgrave, Ralph S., 2014. "The Solution is Full Reserve / 100% Reserve Banking," MPRA Paper 57955, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ben Dyson & Graham Hodgson & Frank van Lerven, 2016. "A response to critiques of ‘full reserve banking’," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 40(5), pages 1351-1361.
    4. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929, December.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 287-327, April.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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