IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/88366.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competition for Foreign Capital under Asymmetric Revenue-Orientation

Author

Listed:
  • Pal, Rupayan
  • Sharma, Ajay

Abstract

This paper develops a model of inter-regional competition for mobile capital considering that regions may have different revenue-orientations. It shows that, if regions are asymmetric in terms of revenue-orientation, the less revenue-orientated region obtains higher tax-revenue and higher social welfare in the equilibrium than the more revenue-oriented region. However, if regions are symmetric, the equilibrium tax-revenue and social welfare are higher in the case of greater revenue-orientation of regions. Moreover, regions spend on public-investment and end up with Pareto-inferior equilibrium outcome, regardless of whether regions are symmetric or asymmetric. It also analyses implications of public-investment spill-over on equilibrium outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Pal, Rupayan & Sharma, Ajay, 2016. "Competition for Foreign Capital under Asymmetric Revenue-Orientation," MPRA Paper 88366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:88366
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88366/1/MPRA_paper_88366.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1105-1121, June.
    2. Kempf, Hubert & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 768-776, October.
    3. Pieretti, Patrice & Zanaj, Skerdilajda, 2011. "On tax competition, public goods provision and jurisdictions' size," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 124-130, May.
    4. Hindriks, Jean & Peralta, Susana & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. "Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2392-2402, December.
    5. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in the tax competition race," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10039, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    6. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October.
    7. Dembour, Carole & Wauthy, Xavier, 2009. "Investment in public infrastructure with spillovers and tax competition between contiguous regions," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 679-687, November.
    8. Kempf, H. & Rota Graziosi, G., 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition: a timing game perspective," Working papers 299, Banque de France.
    9. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 283-296, May.
    10. Christian Bellak & Markus Leibrecht & Jože P. Damijan, 2009. "Infrastructure Endowment and Corporate Income Taxes as Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern European Countries," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 267-290, February.
    11. Pal, Rupayan & Sharma, Ajay, 2013. "Endogenizing governments' objectives in tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 570-578.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sharma, Ajay & Pal, Rupayan, 2019. "Nash equilibrium in tax and public investment competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 106-120.
    2. Rupayan Pal & Ajay Sharma, 2011. "Competition for foreign capital: Endogenous objective, public investment and tax," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2011-021, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    3. Patricia Sanz‐Córdoba & Bernd Theilen, 2018. "Partial Tax Harmonization Through Infrastructure Coordination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1399-1416, April.
    4. Pal, Rupayan & Sharma, Ajay, 2013. "Endogenizing governments' objectives in tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 570-578.
    5. Carsten Eckel & Yutao Han & Kate Hynes & Jin Zhang, 2021. "Structural fund, endogenous move and commitment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(2), pages 465-482, April.
    6. Yongzheng Liu & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2015. "Public Input Competition under Stackelberg Equilibrium: A Note," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 1022-1037, December.
    7. Yongzheng Liu & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2011. "Public Input Competition, Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1123, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    8. Hindriks, Jean & Nishimura, Yukihiro, 2014. "On the timing of tax and investment in fiscal competition models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014065, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Yutao Han & Xi Wan, 2019. "Who benefits from partial tax coordination?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 1620-1640, May.
    10. Keisuke Kawachi & Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2019. "Endogenizing government’s objectives in tax competition with capital ownership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 571-594, June.
    11. Gerda Dewit & Kate Hynes & Dermot Leahy, 2018. "Corporate Tax Games With Cross‐Border Externalities From Public Infrastructure," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1047-1063, April.
    12. Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers halshs-01332058, HAL.
    13. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Giuseppe Pulina, 2023. "The impact of tax and infrastructure competition on the profitability of local firms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(2), pages 281-304, April.
    14. Yutao Han, 2013. "Who benefits from partial tax coordination?," DEM Discussion Paper Series 13-24, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    15. Holger Gillet & Johannes Pauser, 2018. "Public Input Provision in Asymmetric Regions with Labor Market Imperfections," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 19(4), pages 466-492, November.
    16. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2021. "Tax competition and political agency problems," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 1782-1810, November.
    17. Eichner, Thomas, 2014. "Endogenizing leadership and tax competition: Externalities and public good provision," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 18-26.
    18. Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2017. "Strategic delegation in asymmetric tax competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 237-251, November.
    19. Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 359-402, February.
    20. Lv, Bingyang & Liu, Yongzheng & Li, Yan & Ding, Siying, 2018. "Fiscal incentives, competition, and investment in China," BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/2018, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric revenue orientation; Competition for foreign capital; Prisoners’ Dilemma; Public investment; Spillover; Tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
    • R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
    • R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:88366. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.