Using strong isomorphisms to construct game strategy spaces
When applied to the same game, probability theory and game theory can disagree on calculated values of the Fisher information, the log likelihood function, entropy gradients, the rank and Jacobian of variable transforms, and even the dimensionality and volume of the underlying probability parameter spaces. These differences arise as probability theory employs structure preserving isomorphic mappings when constructing strategy spaces to analyze games. In contrast, game theory uses weaker mappings which change some of the properties of the underlying probability distributions within the mixed strategy space. In this paper, we explore how using strong isomorphic mappings to define game strategy spaces can alter rational outcomes in simple games, and might resolve some of the paradoxes of game theory.
|Date of creation:||21 Jul 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- A. Meltzer & Peter Ordeshook & Thomas Romer, 1982. "Introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 1-3, January.
- Hart, Sergiu, 1992. "Games in extensive and strategic forms," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 19-40 Elsevier.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40139. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.