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A Mountain Biker cannot start a journey in sixth gear: An Assessment of the U.N. Global Compact’s Use of Soft Law as a Global Governance Structure for Corporate Social Responsibility

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  • Ghafele, Roya
  • Mercer, Angus

Abstract

The practical impossibility of employing hard law at an international level has meant that softer codes of conduct have stepped in to fill the void. The Global Compact is the most ambitious of these codes, created with a desire to engage business in the project of international development and thus develop a global governance structure for corporate social responsibility. Soft law instruments, such as voluntary standards and framework agreements have been roundly criticised for being vague and indistinct and creating commitments that may be subjective, tentative and conditional. However, what appears to be lacking in the existing literature is a critical analysis of the governance structures created by a voluntary regulatory instrument like the Global Compact using a framework capable of both assessing the initiative’s merits and weaknesses, and tracing its development. Through examining the use of soft law by the Global Compact, we argue that although many question or dismiss its non-binding approach, it provides an illustrative example of the benefits of soft law over harder forms of legislation. One of the most important lessons to take from the case study is that the use of soft law as a global governance structure of corporate social responsibility should not be dismissed as a ‘Plan B’ in the event that harder law is not practical. Corporate social responsibility is a relatively recent phenomenon; clear benefits exist in starting an international regulatory mechanism at the softer end of the legalization spectrum, before toughening up later on.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghafele, Roya & Mercer, Angus, 2011. "A Mountain Biker cannot start a journey in sixth gear: An Assessment of the U.N. Global Compact’s Use of Soft Law as a Global Governance Structure for Corporate Social Responsibility," MPRA Paper 37861, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37861
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aldy,Joseph E. & Stavins,Robert N. (ed.), 2007. "Architectures for Agreement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521871631.
    2. Sikkink, Kathryn, 1986. "Codes of conduct for transnational corporations: the case of the WHO/UNICEF code," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 815-840, October.
    3. Andrew Kuper, 2004. "Harnessing Corporate Power: Lessons from the UN Global Compact," Development, Palgrave Macmillan;Society for International Deveopment, vol. 47(3), pages 9-19, September.
    4. Aldy,Joseph E. & Stavins,Robert N. (ed.), 2007. "Architectures for Agreement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692175.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    U.N. Global Compact; Soft Law; Corporate Social Responsibility; Global Governance; Legalization Spectrum; Obligation; Precision; Delegation; Naming & Shaming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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