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Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy: Revisited

Listed author(s):
  • Antoniou, Fabio
  • Tsakiris, Nikos

In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the fims are located in different countries. In this paper, we show that the relative number of firms located in each country is also critical. In particular, we illustrate that with quantity competition and under the presence of demand and cost uncertainty information sharing does not occur when the number of firms in one country is higher than the number of firms in the other country. Moreover, we show that the informational prisoner's dilemma in the current context appears only when the number of firms across countries is equal.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32949/1/MPRA_paper_32949.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32949.

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Date of creation: 22 Aug 2011
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32949
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  1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
  2. Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2007. "Information and Disclosure in Strategic Trade Policy," ISER Discussion Paper 0705, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  3. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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