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The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests

Author

Listed:
  • Martimort, David
  • Stole, Lars

Abstract

This note uses techniques developed for aggregate games to characterize the set of equilib- ria for a beauty contest or prediction game in which the experts’ preferences are quadratic, but with an otherwise unrestricted information structure for private signals and the state variable. We show that, on aggregate, the experts’ collective estimate of the unknown parameter to be estimated is unbiased for every equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests," MPRA Paper 32872, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32872
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32872/1/MPRA_paper_32872.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games," MPRA Paper 32871, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, July.
    3. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2008. "On the Sources and Value of Information: Public Announcements and Macroeconomic Performance," Economics Series Working Papers 411, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-1134, December.
    5. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games," MPRA Paper 32874, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Cornand & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2015. "Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination," Working Papers halshs-01116156, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aggregate games; beauty contests; prediction games;

    JEL classification:

    • C8 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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