Renegotiation and Relative Performance Evaluation: Why an Informative Signal may be Useless
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References listed on IDEAS
- Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
- Takayama,Akira, 1985. "Mathematical Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521314985.
- L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
- repec:bla:joares:v:35:y:1997:i:2:p:273-278 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:bla:joares:v:37:y:1999:i::p:187-214 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsinformativeness; monitoring; renegotiation; principal-agent model;
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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